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Abstract: In recent empirical work, institutions have been shown to explain a significant 
share of the differences in cross-country accumulation, productivity, and output levels.  
The key institution that determines sustained development in R&D based growth models 
is the strength of intellectual property rights, which have thus far been assumed to be 
exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights 
institutions to study how incentives to protect and exploit property rights affect economic 
growth.  
Our model explains endogenous differences in the strength of intellectual property rights 
across countries and highlights development thresholds that are related to the quality of 
such property rights.  We show that market size is a crucial determinant of the existence 
and high quality of such institutions. In addition we find that the endogenous 
determination of the strength of intellectual property rights generates multiple equilibria 
and an institutional development threshold that must be overcome if an economy is to 
have strong institutions and rapid growth in the long run.  This result is in line with the 
observed transition of early/small economic communities with common property laws to 
mature nation states with large institution-based societies.  
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1. Introduction 
In contrast to the voluminous descriptive and empirical literature on the endogeneity of 
institutions, the theoretical growth literature has traditionally taken institutions or the 
quality of their enforcement as exogenous.  This paper integrates endogenous institutions 
into an R&D based model of economic growth, to understand economic agents’ incentives 
to engage in institutional improvements or to exploit institutional imperfections.  The goal 
is to provide theoretical foundations for the importance of institutions documented by 
cross-country empirical analyses.  
Two major events have brought about a rising interest on the role of institutions, so 
much so that the World Bank devoted its entire 2002 World Development Report to 
analyzing appropriate institutions for market economies.  First is the realization that 
economic and institutional development must occur simultaneously.  Evidence from 
transition economies suggests that the liberalization of prices and production do not lead to 
immediate, unqualified economic success.  Instead, the absence of institutions is the most 
commonly cited reason for the failure of transition economies to grow.  In a similar vein, 
financial liberalization in the absence of suitable supervisory institutions has been argued 
to be a cause of the recent Asian financial crisis. 
The second cause for the surge of interest in the effects of institutions on economic 
performance lies in the cross-country data.  Years of modeling endogenous knowledge to 
augment the basic Solow growth model have generated a wealth of theoretical 
predications.  Growth accounting exercises show, however, that these predictions have not 
led to satisfactory explanations for the large and persistent variations in Solow residuals 
across countries (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999). 
  1The growth experience of transition economies and the large remaining cross-
country variations in the Solow residual have led economists to approach institutions as 
possible explanatory variables of last resort.  Hall and Jones (1999), for example, 
document that cross-country differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and output 
per worker are driven not only by differences in government policies, but also by 
institutions.  Similar studies have been conducted for transition economies with similar 
results (e.g., Grigorian and Martinez, 2002).  Acemoglu et al (2001, 2002) also document 
the long run impact of institutions as it relates to a countries colonial history  
While the empirics of property rights and growth are extensive, the theoretical 
literature is scarce. This is largely due to the difficulty in defining institutions. North and 
Thomas (1973) developed the notion that “social infrastructure” (interpreted as 
“government institutions” in Hall and Jones, 1999) or “social technology” (“patterned 
human interaction”, see Nelson and Sampat, 2001) reduces uncertainty and transaction 
costs to allow agents to capture the full social returns to their actions.
1  For all practical 
matters, Rodrik (1995) argues that institutions encompass property rights, regulatory 
institutions, macroeconomic stability, social insurance, and conflict management.   
Any theoretical analysis of institutions will necessarily adopt a particular 
interpretation of this broad term. The existing theoretical literature on institutions and 
growth has focused on the protection of property rights, and in particular of property rights 
over physical capital.  In contrast, in this paper we examine the role of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs).  This is an important distinction for two reasons; first the non-
exclusivity IPR makes them particularly vulnerable to misappropriation. Secondly, R&D 
based growth models rely on private innovative activity to drive growth, implying that 
                                                 
1 Other contributors to the voluminous descriptive literature on institutions are, among others, Olson (1965, 
1982), Baumol (1990), North (1990).  Below we focus only on the link between institutions and growth and 
within that context only on intellectual property rights and growth. 
  2only those institutions that protect the rewards to innovation are the ultimate determinants 
of sustained growth.  
The focus on IPRs also implies that private investment in the quality of intellectual 
property right protection becomes crucial. For an institutional framework to be successful 
at protecting individuals, both the written law (formal institutions) and the implementation 
of the law (informal institutions), have to ensure this protection.  Although the written law 
is (often) the result of some collective decision-making process, its implementation may 
require significant private investment.  The patent literature, for example, considers patent 
infringement suits a necessary step to establish the value of a patent (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman 2001).  Differences in implementations of formal institutions can have 
significant impact on the effective institutional framework, as illustrated by the fact that 
the US and Liberia share the same Constitution, but differ markedly in their enforcement.
2  
In her description of the early British patent system Khan (2003) argues that “potential 
patentees were well advised to obtain the help of a patent agent to aid in negotiating the 
numerous steps [...] required for pursuit of the application in London”, and that even after 
the patent had been awarded “patent rights could not be regarded as settled unless the 
patent had been contested in court with a favorable outcome”. Our approach below 
concentrates on the role of individual decisions to invest in the effectiveness of the 
institution system. 
We present two models.  First agents are assumed to take the strength of property 
rights as given, in an effort to derive the basic intuition that relates IPR institutions and 
R&D based growth.  As in Magee, Brock and Young (1989) and Murphy Shleifer and 
Vishny (1991), we find that a fraction of the population (“predatory agents”) engages in 
rent seeking (“parasitical litigation” in the Magee et al. setup).  This simple model of 
  3institutions highlights three effects of misappropriation due to imperfect property rights, 
all of which reduce the growth rate.  First, as researchers cannot capture the full value of 
their patents, research becomes less attractive.  Second, as rent seeking increases, 
manufacturing employment and output decline.  Lastly, as manufacturing output falls, 
demand for new technologies erodes and the value of new technologies is reduced.  As in 
previous (static) models, the equilibrium growth rate declines in the share of predatory 
agents.  
It is important to recognize, however, that not all agents who do not work in 
manufacturing engage in parasitical litigation.  Indeed Magee (1992) estimates significant 
benefits to the effectiveness of a legal system.  His empirical approach implicitly assumes 
an endogenous institutions model similar to the one we propose below, where a fraction of 
the population is hired to explicitly build and maintain institutions.  In our second model 
we thus follow Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), who model “bureaucrats” as both enforcers 
of property rights and rent-seekers, to examine endogenous institutional quality, focusing 
not only on the prevention of predatory activities, but also on the determinants that foster 
the strength of intellectual property enforcement. 
Once we allow for endogenous IPR protection multiple equilibria appear.  Two 
equilibria exhibit positive growth, and there is the possibility of a poverty trap.  A high 
growth equilibrium is characterized by high quality institutions, extensive R&D, and a 
high ratio of researcher to predators.  Manufacturing employment is comparatively small 
in this equilibrium, and rapid growth is sustained through fast technological change.  In 
contrast, a low growth equilibrium features weak institutions, little research, a low ratio of 
researcher to predators, and a large share of the population engaged in manufacturing.  
Lastly, we find a poverty trap where neither institutions nor innovation exists. Because of 
                                                                                                                                                   
2 IPRs are often part of the constitutional framework.  Indeed, the US Constitution provides protection to 
  4the lack of investment in property rights protection, all research activity ceases, resulting 
in a pure manufacturing economy without technical progress or growth.  
Two crucial results emerge. First, market size, and hence population, is a crucial 
determinant of whether or not an equilibrium with any type of property rights even exists. 
This feature of our model is consistent with North’s (1990) notion that early human 
settlements existed without property rights and that population growth and the larger scale 
required by agriculture and animal husbandry led to the evolution of property rights.
3  
Second, in the presence of multiple equilibria, we find an institutional-quality threshold. 
Policy can move a country to the high-growth equilibrium only if it establishes a 
sufficiently high level of intellectual property right protection. Strong IPR protection will 
generates enough research activity to provide the incentives to maintain the institutional 
quality.  Otherwise, insufficient investment in the maintenance of property rights 
eventually leads to large-scale misappropriation of the returns to innovation and a fall in 
R&D activity as the economy reverts to the low-growth equilibrium.  This result sheds 
light on the evidence provided by Acemoglu et al (2001) on the importance of the type of 
colonial influence.  They show that strong institutions in settlement colonies have had a 
positive impact on long-run economic performance, while weak institutions in 
extractionary colonies have not.  
Our paper relates to a number of different literatures. The positive correlation 
between intellectual property rights and growth in our model is strongly supported by the 
empirical literature on innovation.  Khan and Sokoloff (2001) provide extensive evidence 
that the early development of broad access to IPR institutions with strict enforcement was 
                                                                                                                                                   
inventors. 
3 There also exists evidence that institutions can be “imported” (with mixed success) however, and that 
participatory regimes (i.e., democracy) are conducive to institution-building (e.g., Rodrik 2000).  Another 
branch of the literature examines endogenous formal institutions such as political institutions and 
cconstitutions to optimize tension between the state, the rulers/enforcers and economic agents (Aghion, 
Alesina and Trebbi 2002, and Barzel 2002).  
  5crucial to the US moving from being a net importer to becoming a net exporter of patents.  
Gould and Gruben (1996) and Kanwar and Evenson (2001) document a positive relation 
between property rights and growth or innovation. Moreover, Ginarte and Park (1997) 
find, in a study of over 120 countries, that the relation between IPR strength and 
innovation exhibits threshold effects: the research sector has to attain a minimum size 
before increased property rights improve economic performance. 
There exists an established literature with a broad vision of institutions that 
pertains to crime/expropriation and corruption starting with Grossman and Kim (1995, 
1996), and Mauro (1995) (see Bardhan, 1997, for a survey).  However, these models share 
a focus on the analysis of crime and corruption in the absence of institutions, rather than 
on the incentives for institution-building.  Within that literature, our set up is most closely 
related to the theory of property rights security by Grossmann and Kim (1995), where 
agents accumulate defensive and offensive weapons to prevent or foster predation.  In our 
dynamic model, as in the static analysis of Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), property rights 
are never perfect because the cost of establishing such high quality institutions is 
prohibitive.   
The literature on rent-seeking and talent allocation has addressed related issues.  In 
their seminal paper, Murphy Shleifer and Vishny (1991) explicitly indicate how talent 
misallocation due to rent seeking reduces growth.  Rent seeking returns are shown to rise 
with market size and returns to scale in each sector, as in our model.  However, the 
endogeneity of the strength of institutions in our model generates a counterbalancing 
effect: the incentives to invest in high quality property rights to protect innovators from 
predation itself increases market size to and returns to scale.  Multiple equilibria are 
ubiquitous in the talent and rent seeking literature, where the low-growth/high-rent-
seeking equilibrium is stable the absence of policy intervention.  In contrast, in our model, 
  6the endogeneity of institutions implies that the stability of the high or low quality 
institution equilibrium depends on country characteristics.  Acemoglu’s (1995) analysis of 
the allocation of talent allows for endogenous reward structures, which are determined by 
the proportion of agents engaged in each type of activity. Our paper takes this approach 
one step further by arguing that the rewards structure, but also the exact institutional 
arrangement that ultimately determines the nature of the rewards structure, is the result of 
agents profit maximization.   
A recent literature has started to develop growth models with endogenous 
institutions.  Tornell (1997) and Zak (2002) examine crime and expropriation in the 
context of an investment-driven growth model, and identify savings as the key determinant 
of institutional quality. Our focus on patents rather than physical capital, allows us to link 
institutions directly to sustained growth. It also highlights the role of monopoly power, 
research efficiency, and market size.  The paper closest to ours is Acemoglu, Aghion and 
Zilibotti (2003), which also addresses the relationship between institutions and the 
incentives to innovate.  Their concept of institution is the type of “contracts” rather than 
the degree of property right protection.  The implications are consequently very different. 
In particular, understanding institutions as contracts implies that there are no growth 
enabling or growth reducing institutions; rather the notion is that different types of 
institutions are more suitable at different stages of development. Furthermore, in their 
setup the adoption of different institutions involves a (political) fixed cost that may trap 
countries in the “wrong” institutional framework. In contrast, our emphasis is not on the 
costs of establishing institutions, but rather on the cost of enforcing and maintaining them. 
Both aspects are clearly important and complementary. Our approach to endogenous 
institutions highlights the importance of ongoing maintenance costs involved in quality 
  7institutions, and the role that private expenditures play in determining the effective 
institutional framework. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces the model, taking 
institutions as given. Section 3 is the core of the paper; it endogenizes institutions and 
examines the resulting equilibria. We conclude in section 4. 
 
2.  A Simple Model of IPR Protection and Growth 
We introduce imperfectly protected intellectual property rights into Romer’s (1990) model 
of R&D-based endogenous growth, and interpret the strength of IPR protection as a 
measure of institutional quality.  It is thus the quality of institutions, not their very 
existence that is captured by our model and the strength of these institutions pertains only 
to the ability of patent holders to protect their property rights. We first examine an 
economy with exogenous institutional quality, in order to highlight who are the winners 
and looser when property rights are strengthened. In the second part of the paper we use 
these insights to understand the incentives of agents to maintain and improve intellectual 
property right protection. 
 
2.1. Research and Production 
Consider an economy that is populated by a continuum of identical individuals, who 
supply L units of labor inelastically.
4  Each individual maximizes her utility across time. 

















=  (1) 
where c is per capita consumption, σ the inverse of the elasticity of substitution, and ρ 
the discount rate.   
                                                 
4 The production structure follows Jones (1995) and Arnold (2000) who abstract, without loss of generality, 
from different types of labor. 
  8There are two types of goods in the economy: a single final good, which is the 
numeraire, and a continuum of intermediate capital goods. Final output, Y, is produced in a 
competitive sector with a technology that exhibits constant returns at each point in time, 
according to 
   (2)  () ∫
α α − =
A
Y dj j x L Y
0
1
where A is the number of different intermediate inputs used in production, x represents the 
amount of each intermediate used, and   is the amount of labor employed in the 
manufacturing sector. Different types of intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes in 
the production of the final good.  
Y L
Each intermediate is produced using a different blueprint,  , and one unit of 
capital, K. The aggregate capital stock thus satisfies  .  In the symmetric 
equilibrium, equal quantities of all intermediates are used in production, hence the 




dj j x K
0
Ax K = .  This allows us to express the 
production function as  
  ( )
α α − = K AL Y Y
1  (2’) 
The reformulated production function highlights that technological change, taking the 
form of increasing product variety, is labor augmenting.   
There are two sources of accumulation in the economy, physical capital and 
knowledge. Assuming no depreciation of capital goods, capital accumulates according to  
  . (3)  C Y K − = 
The state of knowledge is parameterized by the number of existing blueprints for 
intermediate goods. New blueprints are generated in a research sector according to 
Romer’s (1990) R&D function: 




R =  , (4) 
where   are the number of workers employed in research, 1/a  the productivity of 
researchers, and it is assumed that there is an intertemporal spillover of knowledge.  
R L
Under perfect property rights, once a blueprint is invented, it becomes the property 
of innovators, who sell it to a single intermediate goods producer at a price  . Since 
intermediates are imperfect substitutes, there is monopolistic competition in the 
intermediate goods sector. Each producer faces a downwards-slopping demand function,  
A P
   (5)  i x L p
i i Y x ∀ =
− −    
1 1 α α α
and charges a monopoly price  α / r pi = , where r is the interest rate. In equilibrium this 
price will be the same for all varieties. The resulting instantaneous profits obtained by 
each intermediate producer are  
  px ) 1 ( α π − = , (6) 
Note that the demand for intermediaries, and consequently profits, are higher the larger 
manufacturing employment is.  
The innovator that holds the patent for a particular variety chooses the price of the 
blueprint,  , so as to extract the entire stream of monopoly profits generated by the good. 
Hence the value of the blueprint is given by the profit condition 
A P
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Arbitrage determines the evolution of the price of technology as a function of the rate of 
interest and profits over time. In steady state,  r PA / π = , implying that the price of new 
  10technology increases in the expected profit stream. Larger manufacturing sectors increase 
the rental rate on intermediate goods, (see 5), generating not only higher profits, but also 
higher prices for the technology blueprints. 
 
2.2. Exogenous Institutions 
The strength of intellectual property rights in the model determines how much of the value 
of innovations can actually be captured by inventors. In particular, the weakness 
intellectual property right institutions lead to extralegal misappropriations undertaken by 
agents who exploit imperfect property rights.  In a world with imperfect property rights, 
inventors reap only a fraction  () [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ t q  of the total value of any given invention,  . 
Then, q represents the quality of intellectual property right protection.  For now, we take 
this fraction as given, to highlight the impact of institutions on the rate of innovation.  
A P
As a result of imperfect patent property right protection, an inventor can obtain 
only a fraction of the value of the patent,  , while  A qP ( ) A P q − 1  of the value of inventions is 
misappropriated by other individuals.
5  Workers in the research sector are paid their 
marginal product, which is now a function of the quality of institutions  .  
Akin to Krueger’s (1974) approach to rent seeking, it is in the economic interest of agents 
to leave their productive activities in either research or manufacturing and attempt to 
expropriate imperfectly protected property.  
a A qP w A R / =
At any point in time, an amount ( ) A P q A  − 1  can be misappropriated. Following 
Brock, Magee and Young (1989), we label agents who exploit weak property rights 
                                                 
5 As will become apparent later on, we are not assuming that the absence of property rights renders 
blueprints freely available. Rather we assume that those who misappropriate reap the same profits that the 
innovator would have received. In essence the predator gets to sell the blueprint to intermediate goods 
produces without having to have worked for it.  
  11“predatory agents.” Predatory agents,   each obtain an income   such that the entire 
value of unprotected innovations is exhausted,  
P L L w
  ( ) a AL P q w L R A P P / 1− =  (9) 
With exogenous institutions, the model remains exceedingly simple and the steady 
state implications are easily attained. Labor market equilibrium requires all wages to be 








q ) 1 ( α − = . (10) 
Using equations (5), (6), and (8), we can rewrite equation (10) as 


















The level of employment in production depends on the productivity of researchers, the 
level of institutional quality, the share of intermediate goods in output, and the change in 
the price of innovations.  The faster the price of innovations grows, the larger the 
productivity in research, and the stronger institutions are the greater the incentives to 
engage in research, and hence the lower production employment will be. 











implying that weaker institutions attract relatively more predators.  The labor market 
equilibrium requires that predators, manufacturing workers, and researchers exhaust the 
fixed supply of labor in the economy, L, so that 
  R Y P L L L L + + = . (13) 
Equation (12), together with the labor constraint (13), imply that the number of 
innovators is given by  
  12.  ( ) Y R L L q L − = . (14) 
The balanced growth rate can now be derived. In steady state, the stationarity of 
price of innovations,  , implies  0 / = A A P P  q ar LY α / =  and, by (14),  α / ar qL LR − = . 
Since the amount of each intermediate good produced is constant, output growth is given 
by  , while utility maximization implies,  a L A A R / / =  ( ) σ ρ − = r C C /  . These two 
equations together can be solved for the equilibrium interest rate and the balanced growth 








g* . (15) 
Equation (15) implies that growth increases in the efficiency of researchers and in the 
strength of institutions.     
Three reasons induce a lower growth rate under weaker intellectual property rights. 
First, the smaller q, the larger the fraction of the population that engages in unproductive 
rent seeking.  Lowering the quality of property rights protection thus diminishes the labor 
supply available for research and final goods production. Second, a lower q decreases the 
incentives to invest in research for a given level of profits.  The indirect and third effect is 
that the lack of manufacturing workers reduces the demand for intermediate goods and 
hence the profitability of an innovation, thus reducing the value of blueprints and further 
diminishing the incentives to engage in R&D.  
 
3. Endogenous Intellectual Property Rights Protection 
In this section we allow institutional quality to be determined by economic incentives.  
Agents, aware of the rents lost due to predation, possess incentives to improve intellectual 
property right protection.  The strength of these incentives depends on the magnitude of 
potential rents. Second laws exist to protect property rights, and in addition ever better 
  13case law is created through a legal system by institution-building agents (see Magee, 1992 
and Olsen 1992).  While the formal institution of a court is taken as given, the quality of 
the enforcement is now chosen endogenously.  We alter the model by introducing a 
fraction of the population that has the capacity to generate improvements in intellectual 
property rights protection.  
The efforts of institution-building agents must be compensated.  We follow the 
lead of the political economy literature and stipulate that profit-maximizing agents find it 
in their interest to expend resources to protect their own property rights.  In our case, 
innovators realize that part of the value of innovations is misappropriated, and hence it is 
in their interest to hire institution-building, property rights protecting agents.  To 
approximate institution-building we introduce an institution “production function” 
  [] 0 , 0 , 0    with   , , < < > = L L L L B t F F F L L F q
B B B . (16) 
This function stipulates that the quality of institutions depends positively on the number of 
institution-building agents,  , and negatively on the size of the economy as measured by 
its population, L. This last assumption implies that the strength of institutions depends on 
the size of the population relative to a given number of institution builders that enforce 
property rights. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the elasticity of institutional 
quality with respect to institution-building agents is constant, and that in the absence of 
institution-building agents there is no protection of intellectual property rights 
whatsoever,
B L
0 ) , 0 ( = L F . 
 
3.1. The Instantaneous Equilibrium 
Innovators are assumed to hire agents in order to protect their property rights over new 
technologies. They then choose the number of institution-building agents so as to 
maximize their net income, that is  
  14  [ ] B B A B R
L
L w a A P L L F L
B
− / , max . (17) 
The optimality condition following from the innovators choice of investment in 
institutional quality stipulates that the marginal cost of hiring another institution-building 
agent (her wage) must equal the marginal benefit embodied in the change of the 







L = β , (18) 
where β  is the elasticity of institutional quality with respect to institution-building agents.  
Free entry into the research sector implies that wage payments to researchers and to 
institution-building agents must exhaust the return from innovation. That is,  
  a A qP L L w L w A R B B R R / = +  (19) 
Equations (18) and (19) together yield the research wage  ( ) a A qP w A R / 1 β − = .   
       In  equilibrium  all  workers  must  receive the same wage. The first equilibrium 
condition,  , yields a relationship between researchers and institution-building 
agents,  


























Note that both expressions require the elasticity of institutions with respect to   not to 
exceed unity to insure the existence of an equilibrium with institutions. Equality between 
wages in the research and the production sectors, 
B L
Y R w w = , renders the equilibrium price 
of blueprints, 













       Equations (16), (20), (21), and (23), together with the labor market constraint  
  Y B R L L L L L L + + + = , (23) 
yield the instantaneous labor market equilibrium of the economy,  
  ( ) [ ] L q L L F q Y , − = β . (24) 
  ( )q L L L Y B − = β  (25) 
  ( )( )q L L L Y R − − = β 1  (26) 
  ( )( ) q L L L Y P − − = 1  (27) 
  Equations (24)-(27) determine   and q as a function of manufacturing 
employment. Given the level of manufacturing employment, the first equation implicitly 
defines the instantaneous level of institutions. Once q is known, we immediately obtain 
the allocation of workers (not employed in production) to each activity: a fraction (1-q) 
engages in predation, while a fraction q is employed by the research sector.  Among the 
latter, a fraction 
P R B L L L , ,
β  works to protect property rights, and the rest in research (1-β ).  
      Given our assumption of diminishing returns to institution-building, we can use the 
implicit function theorem to show that institutional quality increases in the productivity of 
institution-building agents, β , and decreases in manufacturing employment,  0 < Y dL dq  
and  0 > β d dq .  Increasing the productivity of institution builders lowers the marginal 
costs to inventors, which leads to better institutions.  Increases in manufacturing 
employment, in contrast, lower the profitability of a new technologies, which reduces the 
size of the innovation sector and hence the funds available for institution-building. 
       Note that, equation (26) implies that for a given q, the number of researchers declines 
with  β . This can be explained by the fact that a higher productivity of institution builders 
  16makes it profitable to switch workers from research to institution-building.  This 
reallocation of the workforce reduces the number of innovations, although it raises the 
fraction of the patent value that the innovator can obtain.    
 
3.2. The Intertemporal Equilibrium 
The intertemporal general equilibrium requires the analysis of the evolution of 
manufacturing employment over time.  Along the balanced growth path, all variables grow 
at a constant rate. Hence, we follow Arnold (2000) and normalize key variables to attain 
stationarity, using  K Y z K C / , / ≡ ≡ χ .  The dynamic system governing the evolution of 
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The first equation is simply the consumer’s optimal consumption growth decision, where 
 is the equilibrium interest rate obtained from the equality between the marginal 
product of capital, 
z
2 α
z α , and the monopoly price for intermediate goods,  r p / α = . The 
second equation is obtained by differentiating the production function with respect to time. 
The third one is a combination of the labor market equilibrium equation (equation (23)) 
and the arbitrage equation (11), and expresses the evolution of the capital output ratio as a 
function of manufacturing employment and the evolution of institutions. Differentiating 
(24) we obtain the evolution of institutions over time as stated in (31). 
  17Equations (28) to (31) fully characterize the dynamics of the economy. This system 
can be solved for its steady state,   (see appendix), yielding the steady 
state relationship between manufacturing employment and institutional quality 
0 = = = = q L z Y     χ









            We can now obtain the growth rate of output. In steady state, employment in all 
sectors is constant, hence the only input in final goods production that grows over time is 
the number of intermediate goods available. The growth rate of the economy is then 
. Using (26) and (32) we can express it as   a L A A g R / / = ≡ 
  ( )









= , (33) 
which shows that the growth rate is a decreasing function of the level of manufacturing 
employment.  
 
3.3. Characterization of the Equilibria 
3.3.1 Multiplicity 
The steady state levels of manufacturing employment and institutions are determined by 
the dynamic equilibrium and the instantaneous equilibrium conditions, (24) and (32), 
respectively.  That is, by the system   
() [ L q L L F q Y , − = ] β        ( L L )  





Y − + −
=
) 1 (
.       ( G G )  
The first equation, (LL), is simply the instantaneous labor market equilibrium condition 
that holds at any point in time. The level of institutions is decreasing in   because greater 
production employment reduces the size of the labor force available for research and 
Y L
  18institution-building. The second equation, (GG), is the   schedule, which represents 
the steady state combinations of institutions and production employment that ensure goods 
market equilibrium.  The relationship is negative because in order to maintain the 
equilibrium level of research, a deterioration of institutional quality has to be offset by an 
increase in the value of the patent, which in turn requires more manufacturing 
employment.   





























The two schedules are depicted in Figure 1 in (q,  ) space. The (GG) schedule is 
decreasing and convex, and has an asymptote at 
Y L
) /( σ α σ + = L LY . The (LL) schedule is 
also decreasing, concave for  2 / 1 ≥ β , and otherwise convex.
6  The instantaneous labor 
market equilibrium (LL) lies below the (GG) schedule both at  ) /( σ α σ + = L LY  and 
.  Hence, there are either two intersections between (LL) and (GG), or none.   L LY =
The graph indicates the existence of two internal equilibria that exhibit positive 
growth, which can be characterized as follows.  Equilibrium 1 exhibits strong intellectual 
                                                 
6 The LL schedule will always be less convex than the GG schedule, hence its curvature is irrelevant for the 
equilibrium discussions below.  
  19property rights, high research, and a relatively small employment level in manufacturing.  
In contrast, equilibrium 2 features weak property rights, little research, and large 
manufacturing sector employment.  Since the growth rate depends on research 
employment, which declines in manufacturing employment (see equation 34), the growth 
rate will be greater in the strong institutions equilibrium.  
The model’s third equilibrium at  0 , = = q L LY  is a poverty trap where innovation 
simply does not pay. The intuition that innovations cease in a country without property 
rights is readily established: in the absence of institutions all research outlays are fully 
misappropriated, research ceases (equation (30) does not hold), and the economy 
degenerates to the Solow model without technical change.   
 
3.3.2 Institutions and scale effects 
An equilibrium with institutions exists only if the (GG) and (LL) schedules 
intersect.  A crucial factor in determining the relative position of the two schedules is 
population size, or the scale of the economy.  Scale has two opposing effects on growth: 
larger populations constitute larger markets for technologies, which increase intermediate 
good production and the profitability of research.  This in turn provides greater incentives 
to invest in institution builders. At the same time, large populations have a negative direct 
effect since larger countries require more institutional maintenance, as  . The net of 
these two effects, which depends on the specific institution function, determines whether 
size is positively or negatively related to economic growth. 
0 < L F
As an example, let us consider an institution function of the form  L L q B = , so 










σ α σ α 2 ) ( 2
2 , 1 L LY ,   (33) 
⎤ ⎡ + − + σ α ρ α σ α / 16 2
2 L a
    
  20with  < . 
Here growth and institutions deteriorate in the low institution equilibrium as scale 
ses, while the effect for the high institution equilibrium depends on the remaining 
parame
1 Y L 2 Y L
increa
ters that determine market size.  If the R&D sector is productive, the country is 
patient, and the return to innovation high (the very virtues that will be shown below to lead 
countries to the high growth equilibrium in the first place) then larger scale is positively 
related to economic growth. Population growth can then be a source of divergence 
between countries: in economies that already have strong institutions, population growth 
can further strengthen them as incentives to invest in research and protection expand.  In 
countries with weak intellectual property rights, population growth simply increases the 
extent of misappropriation and reduces innovative efforts. 
In our example, there is an explicit population threshold,  ()
2 16 α σ α ρ + ≡ a L , 
such that if L is below L  no equilibrium with institutions can exist.
7  As a result, if the 
population is too small, the economy will be in a poverty trap with no innovation.  This 
feature of the model is consistent with North’s (1990) notion that early human settlements 
existed without property rights, and that population growth led to the evolution of property 
rights. Furthermore, if sharing the same law or language increase the population reach of 
any given innovation, our approach provides some foundation for the finding by Hall and 
Jones (1999) that common country characteristics, such as common law or language, are 
important institutional determinants.  
Market size is also affected by technological parameters.  Production functions 
with small shares of technology (low α ) generate little demand for new intermediate 
goods, 
g
lowering the demand for innovation and intellectual property right protection. The 
remaining comparative statics are strai htforward. Low researcher productivity ( a / 1 ) 
  21shifts the GG curve upwards, and a low productivity of institution builders (β ) increases 
the convexity of the instantaneous labor market equilibrium schedule, LL, both of which 
make an equilibrium with institutions less likely.  As in Tornell (1997), preference 
parameters also matter: a high discount rate (high  ρ ) and low intertemporal elasticities of 
substitution (high σ ) increase the likelihood of a poverty trap. 
The fundamental reason for the importance of market size is the prominence of 
scale effects present in endogenous growth models, where larger economies generate high 
benefit
tor 
The two internal equilibria constitute a novel interpretation of why m nufacturing 
 define the service sector 
employ
s to innovation, as the value of the patent is large.  Countries whose markets for 
technology are small, either because population is small or because the production 
technology implies a low productivity of new technologies, are likely to exhibit weak or 
even no institutions.  Low returns to investment in technological change render research 
less profitable. With fewer funds to hire institution-building agents, property rights are 
weak, reinforcing the lack of incentives to invest in R&D.   
 
3.3.3 Growth,  Institutional  Quality, and the Service Sec
a
employment has been falling in industrialized countries. Let us
ment as  B P L L + , that is, those agents not engaged in research or manufacturing 
production. It can be shown that   ( ) 0 / < + Y B P dL L L d  (see appendix). Countries with 
large shares of em nt in manufacturing do not have the capacity to maintain a large 
service sector that ensures high insti a result, institutional quality and 
smaller manufacturing sectors correlate not only with higher growth rates, but also with 
larger service sectors.   
ployme
tutional quality. As 
                                                                                                                                                   
7 Equation (33) has real roots only if   ( ) 0 / 16
2 ≥ + − L a σ α ρ α . 
  22At the same time, it is possible to use equations (25)-(27) to show that the ratio of 
service sector relative to research activity declines in institutional quality, 
( () ) 0 / / < + L d P
become a predatory agen
ns) 
and un
The stability of equilibria provides additional insights into the conditions that render a 
tution equilibrium.  Focusing on the two dimensions in 
dq L L R B .  Intuitively, the rewards taken away from predatory agents are 
divided between researchers and institution-builders, implying that the incentives to 
t fall faster than the rewards to institution-building increase.   
This implication is supported by the evidence in Magee, Brock and Young (1989), 
who show a negative relationship between researchers/engineers (proxied by physicia
productive predatory agents.  In the context of the Magee et al model, such a 
relationship is not surprising. They only examine the rent-seeking aspect of institutions, 
hence more predators necessarily imply fewer researchers. Our analysis shows that the 
negative relationship persists even after introducing “costly institution building”, where 
both predators and institution builders coexist in a service sector outside manufacturing,  
 
3.4. Stability of the Equilibria 
country in the high or low insti
Figure 1, we analyze the autonomous differential equation system around the stationary 
state,  () ( ) * *, , ,   and   * *, , , z q L g q z q L f L Y Y Y χ χ = =   , where starred variables represent 
steady state values.  The instantaneous labor market equilibrium requires that the economy 
always  on the solid line in Figure 3. The 
dynamics around the  0 = Y L   line depend on the sign of  Y Y L L ∂ ∂ /  , which can be shown to 
depend on whether 
*
Y L  is greater or lower than certain level 
 satisfies (LL), which implies it is always
Y L , where 
() β β ) 1 ( 1 / − + ≡ L L σ Y .  
  23Figure 2 
q q >
*   Stable Equilibria with Institutions 
q









Y L  is in fact a crucial threshold level of manufacturing employment. The stability 
condition defines an institutional development threshold  [ ] L q L L F q Y , ) ( − = β , so that if 




1,,  t h e n   Y Y L L ∂ ∂ /  < 0 and the strong 
intellectual property rights equilibrium is stable. This case is depicted in Figure 2. 
Countries with initial levels of institutions ab  given  2  will converge to 
the strong-institutions equilibrium. As intellectual property rights are progressively better 
protected and growth increases, the service sector expands in ever
ove those
-richer countries where 
high rates of innovation afford an ever-larger stock of institution builders to further protect 
property rights.  Those economies starting below this point converge to the poverty trap: 
the return to research does not cover the cost of establishing sufficient intellectual property 
rights quality to provide adequate returns to innovators, hence innovators leave the 
research sector, which reduces institution-building funds further until the no-research, no-
by  2,q LY




1,,  t h e n  
0 / > ∂ ∂ Y Y L L  , and the weak-institutions equilibrium is instead the only sta
xact stability condition depends on the functional form of the insti




g function, as this determines 
*
Y L .  However, we can establish intuition from the 
general condition  () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 < − − + σ β β L LY , implies that the high-growth equilibrium 
is stable only in e rium is characterized by a comparatively 
small manufacturing sector. In our example in (33), inspection of the solutions indicates 
that this occurs in three cases: if research productivity is high, if the productivity of 
intermediate goods is large, and when a country has a low rate of time preference. 
The stability analysis provides some insights as to why initial conditions, 




dogenous strength of intellectual property rights into an R&D based 
population, is a crucial determinant of whether an equilibrium with strong property rights 
e of colonial institutional influence, have been shown to be so influential in the 
empirical literature. If the strong-institutions equilibrium is stable, then initial conditions 
are a crucial determinant of the long-run equilibrium. Countries where colonization 
imposed weak institutions (i.e. the country could not pass the institutional threshold of 
*
2 q ) 
were not able to sustain such a level of institutions in the long run, and hence eventually 
reverted to the low-growth equilibrium.  For similar reasons, policy may not always be 
effective in generating strong institutions. Only policies that overcome the institutional 
threshold can generate fast growth in the long run.  
 
We integrate en
growth model to analyze the effects of endogenous institutional quality on the 
performance of the economy.  We find that the growth rate and the strength of institutions 
move hand-in-hand, and obtain two crucial results. First, market size, and hence 
  25exists. Second, endogenous strength of property rights are shown to generate multiple 
equilibria and an institutional quality development threshold that must be overcome if an 
economy is to have strong institutions and rapid growth in the long run. The crucial 
determinants of the strength of the institutions are shown to be the efficiency of 
institution-building, and the determinants of patent profitability.  The value of patents 
depends itself on the size of the economy, the productivity in research, and the 
profitability of new technologies in production.   
  The model provides theoretical foundations for several regularities that have been 
discussed in the empirical growth and institutions literature.  Institutional development 
 an equilibrium with institutions exists. On the other, a larger 
thresholds can explain why it is that not all colonies benefited from colonization equally, 
and why minimal standards of institutions are now seen as the key to take off in transition 
economies.  In addition, the model provides a novel interpretation for the decline in the 
manufacturing sector and the rise of the service sector in advanced countries (those with 
the strongest institutions).  The service sector expands naturally in our model as rents from 
innovations rise with growth and market size; hence more resources are spent on services 
to protect property rights.  
  The size of the economy plays a crucial role in our analysis. On the one hand, it 
determines whether or not
population will result in faster growth if an economy is in a strong institutions equilibrium, 
and in slower growth if it finds itself in a weak-institutions equilibrium. A limitation of 
our analysis is that population size is given, yet when we think about growth over the very 
long-run population size is clearly endogenous. Our model seems to indicate that 
population growth can help us understand the advent of events such as the industrial 
revolution, or the current trend towards income divergence between rich and poor 
countries. These are important questions that we leave for future research.  
  26Appendix 
manufacturing employment over time. Let  K Y z K C / , /
The intertemporal general equilibrium requires the analysis of the evolution of the 
≡ ≡ χ . Utility maximization 
implies  , which togeth mulation constraint (3) 
yields 
() σ ρ / / − = r C C  er with the capital accu
() χ σ ρ χ χ + − − = z r / 
z p
. Since the marginal product of capital in the final good 












Wage equalization between the final goods sector and the research sector renders 
the equilibrium price of blueprints,  ( ) ( ) Y A qAL Y a P β α − − = 1 1 , which we can 
differentiate to find the evolution of the price of technology over time that is compatible 
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Using equation (11) and (A.2), we can express (A.3) as  














z Y  
α α β α 1 1  
Y L  by totally differentiating 
   (A.4)
We solve for the evolution of  z and using the production 
function (2) to find  


















Differentiating (24) we obtain the evolution of institutions over time, 
 













This system formed by (A.1), (A.4), (A.5), and (A.6) can be solved for its steady 
, yielding  
 
state 0 = = = = q L z Y     χ
( ) ( )










1 *  (A.7) 
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Y − + −
=
) 1 (
*  (A.9) 
The steady state equilibrium levels of institutions and manufacturing employment are then 
given by 





Y − + −
=
) 1 (
() [] L q L L F q Y , − =
.       ( G G )  
β        ( L L )  
 
  27Differentiating the (GG) schedule we have  0 , 0
2 2 > < Y Y
decreasing and convex in  Y L . It has an asymptote at  ) /(
dL q d dL dq , implying that it is 
σ α σ + = L LY , and takes a strictly 
positive value at  L LY = . Totally differentiating (LL) we have 
Y Y L L
q
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.      (A.11) 
β  and con ex otherwise. Given our 
assumptions on  [] L L F B, , it takes a positive, finite value at  ) /(
v
σ α σ + = L LY , and is 0 at 
L LY = .  
) /( σ α σ + = L L The (GG) schedule is then above the (LL) one both at  Y
L n the (LL) and the (GG) or none. 
 and at 
Y = . Hence, there are either two intersections betwee L
For  2 / 1 ≥ β , the (LL) schedule is convex and the two equ
2 / 1 <
ilibria will always exist. For 
β , no equilibrium with institution ay exist, existence b s m eing less likely the 
smallerβ  is (the more concave the (LL) schedule is). 
anufacturing 
employment changes. From equations (24) to (26), and using (A.10) we have 
We can now examine the variations in the allocation of labor as m
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